Caller-Controlled Admin Registry Bypasses Blacklist and Mint Revocation
Type:Access Control Bypass
cNGN's compliance state—its blacklist and mint permissions—lives in a shared registry object that transfer and mint functions are supposed to check against the issuer's official copy. But nothing in the code verified that the registry a caller supplied actually belonged to the issuer. An attacker could create their own registry naming themselves as owner, with an empty blacklist and unrestricted mint permissions, and pass that forged object into their own transaction instead of the real one.
- A blacklisted (frozen) holder could transfer every cNGN token they controlled to any recipient, defeating the platform's core AML and sanctions freeze
- A minter whose permission had been revoked could still execute every outstanding mint proposal assigned to them, by creating a fresh forged registry for each one
- Both the receiver blacklist check and the exact mint-amount check were evaluated against the attacker's own forged registry rather than the issuer's real one