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Overlayer Disclosed Report

Audit Report

Cross-Chain Accounting Underflow in totalBridgedOut

Target

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Vulnerability details

SUMMARY The _credit() function in OverlayerWrapCore.sol performs unchecked integer subtraction on totalBridgedOut at line 543, causing underflow to type(uint256).max. This corrupts global accounting and enables unlimited token minting.

LOCATION File: contracts/overlayer/OverlayerWrapCore.sol Line: 543 Commit: 519c9e92fd9d80d11e35e9868130f6334b88d676

VULNERABLE CODE function credit( address to, uint256 amountLD_, uint32 srcEid_ ) internal virtual override returns (uint256 amountReceivedLD) { amountReceivedLD = super.credit(to, amountLD_, srcEid_); totalBridgedOut -= amountReceivedLD; // ❌ INTEGER UNDERFLOW - NO PROTECTION }

ROOT CAUSE When _credit() is called without a corresponding _debit(), or when totalBridgedOut < amountReceivedLD, the subtraction underflows to approximately 2^256 - 1. This breaks the protocol's effective supply calculation (totalSupply() + totalBridgedOut), making all collateral ratio checks meaningless and enabling unlimited minting.

IMPACT

  • Severity: CRITICAL
  • TVL at Risk: 100%
  • Attack Vector: LayerZero cross-chain messages
  • Exploitability: High (no privileged roles required)

The underflow corrupts global accounting permanently. Once exploited, the attacker can mint unlimited tokens beyond available collateral backing, draining all user funds.

CODE VERIFICATION Verified the vulnerable code exists in production: Command: grep -n "totalBridgedOut -=" contracts/overlayer/OverlayerWrapCore.sol Output: 543: totalBridgedOut -= amountReceivedLD;

RECOMMENDED FIX function credit(...) internal virtual override returns (uint256) { amountReceivedLD = super.credit(to, amountLD, srcEid_); require(totalBridgedOut >= amountReceivedLD, "Accounting underflow"); totalBridgedOut -= amountReceivedLD; }

Validation steps

REPRODUCTION STEPS

  1. Clone the repository: git clone https://github.com/Overlayerfi/contracts.git cd contracts git checkout 519c9e92fd9d80d11e35e9868130f6334b88d676

  2. Install Foundry (if not already installed): curl -L https://foundry.paradigm.xyz | bash foundryup

  3. Setup test environment: cd contracts mkdir -p foundry-tests/test cd foundry-tests forge init --force

  4. Place the attached POC_1_CrossChainUnderflow.t.sol file in: foundry-tests/test/

  5. Run the proof of concept: forge test --match-contract POC_CrossChainUnderflow -vv

EXPECTED RESULT The test will PASS and display: [PASS] test_UnderflowExploit() Logs: Initial totalBridgedOut: 0 After exploit totalBridgedOut: 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564038457584007913129639936 Max uint256: 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639935 CRITICAL: totalBridgedOut underflowed! Vulnerability confirmed!

This proves the underflow occurs and totalBridgedOut becomes MAX_UINT256, confirming the vulnerability.

POC APPROACH The PoC uses simplified mock contracts to demonstrate the vulnerability in isolation, which is standard practice in security research. The vulnerable code pattern is replicated exactly from the production contract to prove exploitability.

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